Mikhail Klimenko

Associate Professor

Member Of:
  • School of Economics
Office Phone:
Office Location:
Old CE Building, Room 320

Dr. Mikhail Klimenko received his PhD in Business from Stanford University. He joined the Georgia Tech faculty as an Associate Professor of Economics in the School of Economics in 2004. A specialist in international trade theory and policy and telecommunications economics, he has authored multiple papers and book chapters and presented numerous conference papers. His most recent publication is "Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements" is in The Economic Journal 125 (2015), pp. 1818-1849.

Professor Klimenko previously taught at the University of California in San Diego and has held visiting appointments at Nankai University (China), the European University (Russia), SKEMA Business School (France), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain), and St. Petersburg State University (Russia).  He has received research support from the National Science Foundation, the French Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Sciences Po), and the Net Institute and served as reviewer for a number of economics journals and expert advisory panels. He has also served as a consultant for the World Bank.  His recent teaching has included courses in Microeconomics, International Trade Theory, Economics of Telecommunications, and Law and Economics of the World Trading System. He served as Director of Graduate Studies in the Georgia Tech School of Economics from 2005 to 2011.

  • Ph.D., Stanford University
  • M.A., Stanford University
  • M.A., Brown University
Research Fields:
  • Economics of Telecommunications Networks
  • Industrial Organization
  • International Trade
  • Microtheory
  • Asia (East)
  • Europe
  • North America
  • United States
  • Globalization and Localization
  • International Trade and Investment
Courses Taught:
  • ECON-2100: Economics and Policy
  • ECON-2101: The Global Economy
  • ECON-4350: International Economics
  • ECON-4360: Network Economics
  • ECON-6650: International Economics
  • ECON-7121: International Econ I
Selected Publications

Journal Articles

  • Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements

    December 2015

    We use a dynamic incomplete contracting model to show that time structure of trade agreements is related to the characteristics of trade-facilitating investments. If these investments are specialised to trade in a particular homogeneous good, fixed-term agreements are more likely. Fixed-term agreements provide incentives for the initial investment but leave the parties the flexibility to revisit the need for future investment. If the agreement covers trade in multiple sectors or differentiated goods or services, inter-sectoral spillovers reduce risks of overinvestment. In this case, the parties are more likely to choose an evergreen agreement (with an advance termination notice).

  • Policies and International Trade Agreements on Technical Compatibility for Industries with Network Externalities

    April 2009

    The paper considers a country (home) in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over ex ante incompatible domestic and imported products and benefit from a network externality. We analyze the cases with trade under perfect competition and the international duopoly, in which both governments strategically use policies toward compatibility but cannot use conventional trade policies. In both cases, the equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative game depends upon the strength of the network externality effect and involves either an excessively high equilibrium level of compatibility (in combination with either too much or too little trade) or very low equilibrium levels of both compatibility and trade. The paper concludes with the analysis of the international agreements on policies toward compatibility and evaluates the existing provisions in the WTO legal system aimed at minimizing the trade-inhibiting impact of standards and regulations in the area of technical compatibility.

  • Recurrent Trade Agreements and the Value of External Enforcement

    March 2008

    This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions, such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our model, countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and, as a consequence, cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions. By using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties, enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation, despite the lack of coercive power. The occurrence of costly trade disputes, and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses, depend on the degree to which enforcement institutions can verify, and condition on, events that may lead to trade disputes.

  • Technical Compatibility and the Mode of Foreign Entry with Network Externalities

    February 2007

    We examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment: de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent. Two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology. The relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality. The clash between the foreign firm's choice and the local government's ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm.

  • Industrial Targeting, Experimentation and Long-Run Specialization

    February 2004

    This paper emphasizes the experimental nature of industrial targeting policies under uncertainty in a small open economy. A government promotes entry of new firms in selected industries and updates its beliefs about the country's comparative advantage in a Bayesian way. This selective targeting policy is analyzed in the framework of a special type of statistical decision problem known as the multi-armed bandit. The paper analyzes how the costs and benefits of learning about a country's comparative advantage depend on the characteristics of the targeted industries. The framework suggests that even an optimally designed industrial targeting policy may eventually steer the country away from specializing according to its true comparative advantage.

  • Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and the Recent Evolution of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations

    October 2002

    This paper analyzes the effect of a debtor country’s pattern of trade with commercial creditors’ home countries on the outcome of debt-rescheduling negotiations. The analysis reveals that a debtor country with more market power has greater leverage in a three-way debt-rescheduling negotiation that includes the debtor country, its creditors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The paper also considers the effects of the IFI sovereign-debt policy on the bargaining power of the parties in debt-rescheduling negotiations. Two bargaining frameworks analyzed and compared in the paper represent the negotiation mechanism at different stages of the IFI sovereign-debt policy evolution.