Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and the Recent Evolution of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations
|Title:||Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and the Recent Evolution of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations|
|Publication Date:||October 2002|
|Published In:||Journal of International Economics|
This paper analyzes the effect of a debtor country’s pattern of trade with commercial creditors’ home countries on the outcome of debt-rescheduling negotiations. The analysis reveals that a debtor country with more market power has greater leverage in a three-way debt-rescheduling negotiation that includes the debtor country, its creditors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The paper also considers the effects of the IFI sovereign-debt policy on the bargaining power of the parties in debt-rescheduling negotiations. Two bargaining frameworks analyzed and compared in the paper represent the negotiation mechanism at different stages of the IFI sovereign-debt policy evolution.
|Ivan Allen College Contributors:|
Klimenko, Mikhail M. "Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and the Recent Evolution of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations." Journal of International Economics 58.1 (2002): 177-209.