Allocating Group Housing

Title: Allocating Group Housing
Format: Journal Article
Publication Date: November 2017
Published In: Social Choice and Welfare

We study mechanisms for allocating objects to pairs of agents when agents may have nontrivial preferences over objects and pairings. In this environment, the mechanism may distort agents’ preferences over pairings. Compared to certain distortive mechanisms, a non-distortive one always has a stable allocation in our model, and selects stable outcomes that are ex ante preferred by all students under a regularity condition on the distribution of pair values.

Ivan Allen College Contributors:
External Contributors: Flanagan F.X., Griffith A.L.

Burkett J., Flanagan F.X., Griffith A.L., “Allocating Group Housing,” Social Choice and Welfare, 50(4), pp. 581–596, 2018.

Related Departments:
  • School of Economics