Information Disclosure in Auctions with Downstream Competition
| Title: | Information Disclosure in Auctions with Downstream Competition |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Publication Date: | 2018 |
| Published In: | Economic Letters |
| Description: | When bidders’ valuations are derived from a downstream market in which they may compete, the allocation to the firms with the lowest costs can differ from the allocation that maximizes the ex post valuations of the bidders. I consider the problem of auctioning two goods to bidders whose valuations for a good flexibly depend on their and their rival’s costs as well as the identity of the rival. I show that revealing the identities of winners through a sequential auction procedure leads to allocations in which bidders tend to have higher ex post valuations but also higher costs when compared to a simultaneous auction. |
| Ivan Allen College Contributors: | |
| Citation: | Burkett J., “Information Disclosure in Auctions with Downstream Competition,” Economics Letters, 163, pp. 22–26, 2018. |
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